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Substituted Judgment: Does Pennsylvania Law
Provide an Appropriate Standard for Withdrawal of
Life Support in Non-Terminal Patients?
A TRAGIC STORY
On February 25, 1990, Terri Schiavo collapsed in her St. Pe-
tersburg, Florida home.' According to physicians, a potassium
imbalance had caused her heart to stop temporarily She was
eventually revived, though her heart's inability to deliver oxygen
to her brain left her with severe brain damage.' Although she was
able to breathe on her own, most doctors believed Terri was left in
what is known as a "persistent vegetative state" or "PVS.' She
appeared conscious, but doctors concluded she was unable to chew
or swallow her own food.5 As such, a feeding tube was inserted to
provide her with the nutrition required to sustain her life.'
The next fifteen years were marked by tumult for Terri
Schiavo's husband Michael and her parents, Bob and Mary
Schindler. Shortly after Michael Schiavo was awarded a large
sum in a medical malpractice suit, the relationship between him
and the Schindlers began to deteriorate rapidly.7 Following this
verdict, the Schindlers and Michael began to argue frequently
over the money and regarding Terri's care.'
In May of 1998, Michael Schiavo petitioned to have Terri's feed-
ing tube removed.9 Although the court acknowledged that none of
1. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 2001).
2. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 177.
3. Id.
4. Id. According to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the term "vegetative state" is
defined as follows:
The term "vegetative state" describes: a body which is functioning entirely in
terms of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart
beat and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains
reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But
there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the
surroundings in a learned manner.
In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. 1996) (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 267 (1990)).
5. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 177.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 178.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 177.
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her medical problems were life threatening, Michael's request was
granted." The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District,
affirmed this ruling on the basis that Terri Schiavo was in a per-
sistent vegetative state and that her husband had proven by clear
and convincing evidence that his wife would have chosen to dis-
continue the constant nursing care and medical support required
to sustain her condition."
Although the Supreme Court of Florida denied review of this
decision, this was only the beginning of the extensive legal battle
between the Schindlers and Michael Schiavo. On April 26, 2001,
the Schindlers, arguing that new evidence had come to light prov-
ing that Michael Schiavo had committed fraud in the prior pro-
ceeding, petitioned for an injunction to have Terri's life-sustaining
measures restored. 3 The trial court granted the Schindler's re-
quest for an injunction and the feeding tube was re-inserted.1
4
This injunction, however, proved to be but a temporary stay.
After hearing conflicting testimony from no less than five physi-
cians, two of whom alleged that new treatment options could dra-
matically improve the quality of Terri's life, the trial court ruled
that Terri Schiavo remained in a persistent vegetative state. 5 The
Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed. 6 The Supreme Court
of Florida, once again, denied review and the feeding tube was
removed. 7
The next two years would prove even more remarkable than the
prior five. A law was passed by the Florida Assembly granting
Governor Jeb Bush the power to re-insert the feeding tube. 8 A
10. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 177.
11. Id. at 180.
12. Schindler v. Schiavo ex rel. Schiavo, 789 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2001).
13. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
14. Id. at 556.
15. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2002 WL 31817960, at *3-*5
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 2002). The court noted that one expert, Dr. Hammesfahr testified
that a new technology known as vasodilatation therapy would have a positive effect on
Terri's condition. Schiavo, 2002 WL 31817960, at *4. A second expert, Dr. Maxfield, testi-
fied that hyperbaric therapy presented a significant chance of improvement in Terri's cog-
nitive ability. Id. However, the court found the testimony of neither of these physicians to
be credible. Id. at *5.
16. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
17. Schindler v. Schiavo, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003).
18. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 418. The text of the law is provided by the Supreme Court of
Florida in Bush v. Schiavo, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The Governor shall have the authority to issue a one-time stay
to prevent the withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient if, as of
October 15, 2003:
(a) That patient has no written advance directive;
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year later, the Supreme Court of Florida struck the law down as
unconstitutional.19 The tube was removed once again.0
Even the U.S. Congress got involved, passing a law that allowed
the tube to be re-inserted while a federal court reviewed the mat-
ter.21 However, both the U.S. District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
declined to order the tube be re-inserted.2  On March 24, 2005, the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case.2" Terri passed away
on March 31, 2005.24
Once the debate over life and death issues sparked by the
Schiavo case made its way into the national spotlight, the Florida
judicial system found itself the target of harsh criticism. How-
ever, the case of Terri Schiavo is a relatively new type of dispute: a
dispute caused largely by scientific advances which, in many
ways, blur the line between life and death. Given this new scien-
tific landscape, residents of many other states have no doubt been
left to wonder whether their court system is, in fact, any better
prepared to handle such a difficult situation. For residents of the
small town of Southampton in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, the
question probably seemed especially pertinent: "What if Terri had
collapsed in Pennsylvania, rather than Florida?"
Although Terri Schiavo will undoubtedly be associated with the
State of Florida and its judicial system well into the future, she
was not a Florida native. Rather, Terri Schiavo was born in Hun-
(b) The court has found that patient to be in a persistent vegetative
state;
(c) That patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld; and
(d) A member of that patient's family has challenged the withholding of
nutrition and hydration.
(2) The Governor's authority to issue the stay expires 15 days after the effec-
tive date of this act, and the expiration of the authority does not impact the va-
lidity or the effect of any stay issued pursuant to this act. The Governor may
lift the stay authorized under this act at any time. A person may not be held
civilly liable and is not subject to regulatory or disciplinary sanctions for taking
any action to comply with a stay issued by the Governor pursuant to this act.
(3) Upon issuance of a stay, the chief judge of the circuit court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem for the patient to make recommendations to the Governor
and the court.
Section 2. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.
Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 337 (Fla. 2004).
19. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d at 337.
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
22. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1237 (11th Cir. 2005).
23. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005).
24. Friends, Family Attend Service for Terri Schiavo, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 6096515.
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tingdon Valley, Pennsylvania.25 She was confirmed and married
in a small church in Southampton, Bucks County, Pennsylvania."
As fate would have it, Terri moved to Florida in 1986, two years
after she was married and four years before her devastating col-
lapse occurred.27 What if she hadn't?
Pennsylvania law differs from Florida law, in that the State of
Florida requires a surrogate or guardian seeking to remove a feed-
ing tube to prove to a state court by clear and convincing evidence
that the patient would have wanted such treatment withdrawn.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, on the other hand, allows
close family members to make the crucial decision based on their
understanding of what they believe the patient would have
wanted.
This comment seeks to explore the development of these two
standards, as well as their ethical implications, in a manner de-
signed to pose several key questions. First, is Pennsylvania's sub-
stituted judgment approach' an appropriate standard for the
withdrawal of life support in non-terminal patients? Second,
could the Schiavo case have been resolved in a more efficient
manner within the Commonwealth, and, if so, would the outcome
have differed?
THE "RIGHT TO DIE"
Driving the Schiavo controversy was a dispute over what is
commonly referred to as the "right to die." However, reference to
the right in question as "the right to die" exhibits a misunder-
standing of what, in fact, the right truly seeks to protect. It is,
perhaps, best described as the "right to self-determination in re-
gard to the acceptance or rejection of life sustaining medical
treatment."29 As such, it is truly the patient's right to autonomy
that is at issue in these cases, not the right to die in a manner of
her own choosing.
The right to autonomy has a long tradition, with a basis in both
the common-law and the United States Constitution." The consti-
tutional support for such a right is found in the Fourth Amend-
25. Id.
26. Sandy Bauers, Friends Mourn Schiavo at Bucks Service, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Apr. 16, 2005, at B05 available at 2005 WLNR 22976263.
27. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 177.
28. Adopted in In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905,909 (Pa. 1996), discussed infra.
29. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 909 (Pa. 1996).
30. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909.
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ment's unwritten right to privacy.31 This right is best stated as a
patient's right to refuse "intrusions upon his person," regardless of
whether they are purportedly in his best interest.32
The common law basis for such a right also developed from a
person's right of control over his own person.33 This fundamental
common-law right has existed for over a century.34 In the health-
care context, such a right has manifested itself in the requirement
that physicians obtain patients' informed consent prior to com-
mencing treatment. 5 Necessarily, as a physician is required to
obtain consent, patients are given the right to refuse or withdraw
such consent, even if such a decision leads to the patient's death.36
Perhaps the most remarkable development with respect to this
right, however, is the finding that it extends to incapacitated pa-
tients as well.37 As such, the courts have been placed in the diffi-
cult position of developing a reasonable mechanism for the exer-
cise of an incompetent patient's right to autonomy in health care
decisions. This issue has become particularly important within
the context of cases involving the refusal, or withdrawal, of life-
sustaining measures from patients mired in a non-terminal per-
sistent vegetative state.
THE Two STANDARDS
It is certainly not surprising that courts have not been uniform
in their handling of the very difficult issue of withdrawal of life
support in non-terminal PVS patients. As such, two distinct stan-
dards have developed within American jurisprudence to deal with
this issue. The first, the clear and convincing evidence standard,
was held to be constitutional in perhaps the seminal case in this
area, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.38
Nancy Cruzan, the subject of this landmark litigation, was in-
capacitated as a result of injuries she sustained in a car accident.39
31. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (Mass.App. 1978). See also Zant v. Pre-
vatte, 286 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 1982); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
32. Zant, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
33. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909-10.
34. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bostford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
35. Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 668-70 (Pa. 1966).
36. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910 (citing Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 755 (Md. 1993)).
37. See Mack, 618 A.2d 744; Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910; In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash.
1983).
38. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
39. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265.
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She lost control of her car, and it overturned. ° She was found ly-
ing face-down in a ditch, with no detectable heartbeat, and she
was not breathing.
41
Although physicians were able to revive Ms. Cruzan, she had
severe and permanent brain damage and remained in a coma for
three weeks. 42 Despite her eventual emergence from the coma, she
remained in a persistent vegetative state.43 She was able to
breathe on her own and "orally ingest some nutrition."44 However,
given the strained nature of such feeding, surgeons felt it neces-
sary to implant a feeding tube, which they did with the consent of
Ms. Cruzan's husband.45
When it became clear that Ms. Cruzan's condition would not
improve, her parents asked hospital employees to remove the feed-
ing tube.46 They refused, stating that they would not do so without
prior court approval.47 As such, the case wound up in Missouri
State Court and was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court of
Missouri. 8
The standard espoused by Missouri's highest court for with-
drawal of a feeding tube in such a situation required those moving
for withdrawal to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
incapacitated patient would have wanted such treatment re-
moved. 49 At trial, Ms. Cruzan's parents presented evidence of dis-
cussions she had had with a roommate in which she stated she
"would not wish to continue her life unless she could live at least
halfway normally. .. ."0 The trial court found such language suf-
ficient to carry this difficult burden.51 However, the Supreme
Court of Missouri disagreed and refused to order the termination
of medical treatment.52
The Cruzans appealed the ruling of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, arguing that the clear and convincing evidence standard
imposed by the court violated Ms. Cruzan's right under the U.S.




44. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 267.
47. Id. at 268.
48. Id.
49. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268-69.





Constitution to withdraw such treatment.53 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard did, in fact, violate the Fourth Amend-
ment's right to privacy.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in delivering the opinion of the major-
ity, began by noting that, "with the advance of medical technology
capable of sustaining life well past the point where natural forces
would have brought certain death in earlier times, cases involving
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment have burgeoned." 5
Within this context, the importance of determining the constitu-
tionality of such a standard could not be overstated.
The majority noted the long tradition within the common-law
respecting a person's right to refuse medical treatment. 6 How-
ever, it concluded that the only issue properly before the Court
was whether the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated by
Missouri's implementation of such a strict standard.57 Such a de-
termination, the Court held, required the balancing of the State's
interests in sustaining life against the liberty interests of the pa-
tient involved.58
Given that situations will no doubt occur where family mem-
bers, or other surrogate decision-makers, will not keep the best
interests of the patient in mind, the Court reasoned that the
State's interest in protecting these most vulnerable patients from
abuse was quite strong.59 With this interest in mind, the Court
held that the clear and convincing evidence standard is a constitu-
tionally acceptable standard for withdrawal of life support in these
situations.60
While acceptable, "clear and convincing evidence" is not the only
standard that may be implemented by the courts. In fact, the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard is not even the majority
rule.61 Rather, most state courts have chosen to implement the
more lenient "substituted judgment" rule.62
53. Id. at 279.
54. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
55. Id. at 270. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion in which Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined.
56. Id. at 269-77.
57. Id. at 277.
58. Id. at 280.
59. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
60. Id.
61. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 911-12 (Pa. 1996).
62. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 911-12.
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Unlike the "clear and convincing evidence" approach which re-
quires the presentation of evidence of the patient's intent to the
court, the "substituted judgment" mechanism relies solely on the
judgment of a surrogate decision-maker. The role of such a surro-
gate was described by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Matter
of Jobes63 as follows:
Under the substituted judgment doctrine, where an in-
competent's wishes are not clearly expressed, a surrogate
decisionmaker considers the patient's personal value sys-
tem for guidance. The surrogate considers the patient's
prior statements about and reactions to medical issues,
and all the facets of the patient's personality that the
surrogate is familiar with - with, of course, particular
reference to his or her relevant philosophical, theological,
and ethical values - in order to extrapolate what course
of medical treatment the patient would choose.'
As such, the substituted judgment rule places the decision, not in
the hands of the courts, but rather in the hands of family mem-
bers. The court in Jobes felt this was proper, as family members
would have the best understanding of the patient's approach to
life and would also, presumably, be the persons most concerned for
the well-being of the patient.&
One issue left unresolved by the Jobes ruling, however, was how
this system is to operate when close family members disagree with
respect to termination of medical treatment. The Jobes court
stated that surrogate decision-makers are to be close family mem-
bers, such as "a spouse, parents, adult children, or siblings."66
However, it provided no clear hierarchy with regard to such deci-
sion-making. Nor did the court provide any clear mechanism for
resolving such disputes among family members. In fact, the court
held that if proper procedures were followed, "judicial review of
such decisions is not necessary or appropriate." 7 As such, if acting
in good faith and under the direction of a close family member, a
physician could presumably remove life-sustaining measures, even
over the objection of other members of the patient's family.
63. 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
64. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 443-44.
65. Id. at 445.
66. Id. at 447.
67. Id. at 449.
Vol. 44478
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PENNSYLVANIA CONFRONTS THIS DIFFICULT ISSUE
In 1972, when Daniel Fiori was approximately twenty years old,
he suffered severe head injuries as the result of an accident.68 He
regained consciousness, but his cognitive abilities had been
greatly affected 9 In 1976, while being treated at a Veterans Ad-
ministration hospital, he suffered a second head injury.7° He
never regained consciousness following this second injury.71
Mr. Fiori was diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative
state.72 Although he could breathe on his own, his cognitive brain
functions were said to have been destroyed.73 According to physi-
cians, he could feel no pleasure or pain and he was unable to
communicate with others. 74 The nutrition required to keep Mr.
Fiori alive was administered through a feeding tube.75 Although
Mr. Fiori's condition was not terminal, there was no hope that he
76
would recover.
In February 1992, Mr. Fiori's mother, Rosemarie Sherman,
asked nursing home employees to remove her son's feeding tube.7
The home refused to do so in the absence of a court order. 8 Thus,
Ms. Sherman petitioned the Court of Common Pleas, Bucks
County, to have the tube removed.79
During proceedings at the trial court level, Ms. Sherman testi-
fied that she had never spoken to her son regarding his wishes for
what should be done in such a situation.8" She based her opinion
that her son would wish the tube removed on his general "love of
life."8'
The trial court granted Ms. Sherman's motion to have the tube
removed.82 In affirming this decision, the superior court held that
"consent of a close family member along with approval of two
qualified physicians is sufficient to terminate life sustaining










78. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 908-09.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 910.
81. Id.
82. In re Fiori, 17 Pa. D. & C.4th 558, 565 (C.P. Bucks County 1993).
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treatment to a person in a long-term persistent vegetative state
without court involvement." 3
The Attorney General, who had opposed the motion, filed a peti-
tion for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania."' However, while the parties waited for such an allowance
to be granted, Mr. Fiori died of pneumonia.85
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that the death
of Mr. Fiori rendered the case technically moot.86 However, the
court was understandably eager to rule on such an important and
difficult issue. As such, the court held that "because this case
raises an issue of important public interest, an issue which is ca-
pable of repetition yet apt to elude review, we have decided to hear
this appeal."
87
Thus, the issue of determining the proper "procedures and
guidelines for removal of life sustaining treatment from a PVS
patient where the patient, prior to his incompetency, failed to ex-
press his desires on such treatment," was before the Common-
wealth's highest court.88
The majority opinion began by deciding that Pennsylvania
would rely on the common-law, rather than the federal or state
constitutions, in determining the autonomy rights of Mr. Fiori. 9
The court based its decision on the principle that "courts should
avoid constitutional issues when the issue at hand may be decided
upon other grounds."9 ° Thus, one key issue had been resolved.
The court had made clear that, within the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, a patient's right to autonomy was rooted in the
common-law tradition.
The more important question remained, however. Namely, a
decision as to which of the two popular standards for withdrawal
of life support Pennsylvania would choose. The Attorney General
suggested the more stringent approach, the "clear and convincing
83. In re Fiori, 652 A.2d 1350, 1351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).





89. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909. Justice Cappy wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief




evidence rule."9 Not surprisingly, counsel for Ms. Sherman ar-
gued for the application of the doctrine of "substituted judgment." 2
In handling this difficult question, the court found it proper to
rely, not only on the arguments of the parties, but also on Briefs of
Amici Curiae as well. As such, briefs were filed by several inter-
ested parties. The Pennsylvania Medical Society and Choice in
Dying filed briefs in support of Ms. Sherman.93 The Hospital Asso-
ciation of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference,
and the Ethics and Advocacy Task Force of the Nursing Home Ac-
tion Group filed briefs in support of the Attorney General.94 The
University of Pittsburgh Center for Medical Ethics and University
of Pennsylvania Medical Center filed, together, an amicus brief
espousing their independent position as well.95
Given the volume of outside participation, the court clearly un-
derstood the delicate interests at stake in resolving this question.
After careful deliberation, a unanimous court decided that the
substituted judgment approach was a more appropriate process
for dealing with such situations.96
In so holding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the clear
and convincing evidence approach to be "overly restrictive."97 Ac-
cording to the court, "Were this test to be applied, all of those pa-
tients who did not have the prescience or sophistication to express
clearly and unmistakably their wishes on this precise matter
would not be able to have life support removed."9" The court held
91. Id. at 911.
92. Brief of Appellee Rosemarie Sherman, Guardian of the Person of Daniel Joseph
Fiori at 43-46, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No. 6 EAP 1995).
93. Brief of the Pennsylvania Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee
Rosemarie Sherman, Guardian of the Person of Daniel Joseph Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa.
1996) (No. 6 EAP 1995); Brief of Amicus Curiae Choice in Dying in Support of Appellee, 673
A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No. 6 EAP 1995).
94. Brief of Amicus Curiae Hospital Association of Pennsylvania in Support of Respon-
dent, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No. 6 EAP 1995); Brief of Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania
Catholic Conference in Support of Petitioner, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No. 6 EAP 1995);
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ethics and Advocacy Task Force of the Nursing Home Action
Group in Support of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Attorney General, 673 A.2d 905
(Pa. 1996) (No. 6 EAP 1995).
95. Brief for Amici Curiae University of Pittsburgh Center for Medical Ethics and Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Medical Center, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No. 6 EAP 1995). The
brief of these two university medical centers espoused an independent view, not necessarily
in support of either party, arguing for judicial involvement only where irresolvable dis-
agreement existed, either among family members or between family members and physi-
cians.





that it could not tolerate what amounted to the automatic admini-
stration of whatever treatment happened to be available at the
time. 99
Instead, the court reasoned that such a decision is to be made by
a "close family member."'00 The court, however, chose not to define
what constitutes a "close family member."
Despite its decision to implement the more lenient of the two
standards, the court did impose one additional requirement on
surrogates who wish to have life support removed. Before with-
drawal of life-sustaining measures may take place, the surrogate
is required to obtain the written certification of two qualified phy-
sicians that the patient is, in fact, in a persistent vegetative
state.'
Further, the court also appeared to provide for the possibility of
judicial intervention when families do not agree with respect to
these significant healthcare decisions. As the court stated, "where
the physicians and the close family member are in agreement and
there is no dispute between 'interested parties,' there is no need for
court involvement."' In a very important footnote, the court fur-
ther explained what was meant by the term "interested parties."
According to the court, "[i]nterested parties may include, but is not
limited to, close family members, the guardian of the incompetent,
attending physicians, or the care facility in which the patient is
located."0 3 As such, the court made it clear that one family mem-
ber, well-intentioned or otherwise, cannot effectuate the with-
drawal of a feeding tube from a PVS patient over the objections of
other family members, attending physicians, or the facility admin-
istering the patient's care.
SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT:
AN APPROPRIATE CHOICE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH?
One common criticism of the substituted judgment approach,
and one raised by the Attorney General in Fiori, is that by allow-
ing families to determine whether life support may be withdrawn,
the court is abandoning what is, essentially, a judicial function."°
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 912.
102. Id. at 913.
103. Id. at 913 n.13.
104. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Catholic Conference in Support of Petitioner
at 4, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No. 6 EAP 1995).
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The court quickly, and properly, dismissed this argument in
Fiori.°5
In most situations, it is clear that close family members are in a
better position to know a patient's wishes than any court. As
such, when a family is entirely in agreement, both among them-
selves and with treating physicians, judicial intervention would
most likely prove to be an unnecessary burden in an already diffi-
cult time.
A more compelling argument against the substituted judgment
approach, however, is that it fails to provide access to the courts in
times of dispute among family members or physicians. The grav-
ity of this problem was, perhaps, most artfully described in a hy-
pothetical question posed by Judge McEwen, who filed a concur-
ring opinion at the Superior Court level in Fiori. As asked by
Judge McEwen, "[W]hat values does a society reflect when it per-
mits its legal system to require careful judicial scrutiny of deci-
sions affecting the property of an incompetent, but precludes the
similar judicial scrutiny of a decision to terminate tle life of the
incompetent?"16
Clearly the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Fiori was aware of
this inconsistency. As such, the ruling allowed for the possibility
of judicial intervention when "interested parties" disagree regard-
ing the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. The court was
obviously trying to walk a fine line between placing an unneces-
sary burden on families of PVS patients and cutting off access to
the courts altogether. Although the Fiori court provided no clear
mechanism for how such disputes are to be resolved, it did seem to
present a practical compromise aimed at allowing intervention,
but only when necessary.
One of the most difficult criticisms of the substituted judgment
approach to defend, however, is more philosophical in nature.
Simply put, under the substituted judgment approach, a family
member decides what he feels the patient would have wanted.
While the patient's external manifestations of his wishes are con-
sidered, they are not conclusive. The family member is encour-
aged, under the substituted judgment approach, to consider what
105. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 913.
106. Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1364 (McEwen, J., concurring). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
Pennsylvania Catholic Conference in Support of Petitioner at 6, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996)
(No. 6 EAP 1995), which asked in response to Judge McEwen's quote "If one would say




he knows of the patient's values, goals, and philosophy, before
making his decision. However, in the end, it is still the family
member who decides whether or not treatment should continue.
Given that the right in question is, in fact, a right to autonomy,
this seems an inherent contradiction. While the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard is often attacked for being impractical,
at least it properly places the focus on the actual statements and
wishes of the patient. In enforcing a patient's right to autonomy,
the judgment of a patient's family seems utterly irrelevant.
In allowing such a contradiction, the court appears to be endors-
ing a presumption that most people would not wish to continue life
in a persistent vegetative state. Any inherent contradictions are,
as such, ignored in order to achieve this apparently desired end.
Otherwise, there could be no justification for the proposition that
a person's right to autonomy may be exercised through the substi-
tuted judgment of a third party, particularly absent any form of
judicial scrutiny.
Clearly, there are no easy answers to these questions. It ap-
pears the only sure way to make certain that a patient's wishes
are properly carried out is to mandate that every person execute
an advanced health care directive. This is obviously not practical.
Given these limitations, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
created a framework to help deal with these crises on a case-by-
case basis. While the court's approach is not perfect, no system
ever will be. There is simply no way a court, a family member, or
a physician will ever truly be able to ascertain the wishes of an
incapacitated patient lost to a persistent vegetative state.
SCHIAVO REVISITED
The question remains, would Pennsylvania courts have been
better prepared to handle the most difficult case presented by the
bitter division between the parents and husband of Terri Schiavo?
Unfortunately, it appears that the answer is no. While the clear
and convincing evidence approach clearly has some deficiencies,
one practical advantage it possesses is its conclusive reliance on
the patient's expressed wishes. As such, the motives of the indi-
viduals involved should not be terribly relevant.
Under Pennsylvania's substituted judgment approach, the mo-
tives of close family members would be quite relevant in determin-
ing the surrogate's ability to properly effectuate a patient's wishes.
Thus, the personal attacks that grew to dominate the Schiavo con-
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troversy would necessarily be encouraged by the judicial processes
of the Commonwealth.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, there is no clear mechanism
for dealing with disputes among family members under Pennsyl-
vania law. As a result, the procedures themselves would be issues
of first impression.
One can only hope that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took
note of this prolonged controversy and, in its wake, is better pre-
pared to deal with these challenging ethical dilemmas. Perhaps
more importantly, however, one must hope that the citizens of
Pennsylvania paid attention as well, and began preparing for the
possibility that they too could be in this situation someday.
Patrick Reilly

